Amaravati: Development Strategy, Infrastructure, and the Contested Path of Andhra Pradesh’s Capital

Executive Summary

Following the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh in 2014 and the loss of Hyderabad as its capital, the state embarked on an ambitious project to construct a new greenfield capital city, Amaravati. Located centrally between Vijayawada and Guntur on the banks of the Krishna River, the project was envisioned as a world-class, sustainable city, driving economic growth and establishing a new administrative heart for the state. The initial phase saw the establishment of the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority (APCRDA) and the development of a comprehensive master plan, influenced by international expertise, notably from Singapore and UK-based firms like Foster + Partners. A key innovation was the Land Pooling Scheme (LPS), through which approximately 34,000 acres were voluntarily contributed by over 28,000 farmers, primarily smallholders, in exchange for promised developed plots and annuities.

However, the project’s trajectory was significantly disrupted by political shifts. The state government’s decision to proceed with Amaravati diverged from the recommendations of the central government-appointed Sivaramakrishnan Committee, which had advised against concentrating the capital in the fertile VGTM region and advocated for decentralized development. This foundational disagreement foreshadowed future conflicts. In 2019, a change in state government led to the abrupt halting of Amaravati’s development and the introduction of a controversial three-capital plan (Legislative at Amaravati, Executive at Visakhapatnam, Judicial at Kurnool), citing regional balance and alleged irregularities in the original project.

This policy reversal triggered widespread protests, particularly from farmers whose livelihoods were tied to the LPS promises, and led to protracted legal battles. The Andhra Pradesh High Court ultimately ruled against the three-capital legislation, affirming Amaravati as the sole capital and mandating the state to fulfill its commitments under the APCRDA Act and LPS agreements. Although the YSRCP government challenged this in the Supreme Court, the return of the N. Chandrababu Naidu-led government in 2024 resulted in the state formally withdrawing the challenge and reaffirming Amaravati’s status as the single capital.

Since mid-2024, efforts to revive Amaravati have gained momentum. Construction has restarted, numerous large-scale infrastructure tenders have been finalized, and ambitious timelines for completion have been set. Plans are also underway for significant expansion, including a potential second phase of land pooling and the development of an international airport. However, substantial challenges remain, including managing the significant cost escalations resulting from the five-year hiatus, securing adequate funding, meeting aggressive construction schedules, fulfilling obligations to LPS farmers, and ensuring balanced development across all regions of Andhra Pradesh. Amaravati’s future now hinges on sustained political will, robust financial management, and effective execution capacity to translate the revived vision into a functional, thriving capital city.

I. Introduction: The Conception of Amaravati

A. Andhra Pradesh Post-Bifurcation: The Capital Imperative

The passage of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, marked a pivotal moment in the state’s history, leading to its bifurcation and the creation of Telangana on June 2, 2014.¹ A significant consequence of this division was that the existing capital, Hyderabad, geographically located within Telangana, became the capital of the new state.³ While Hyderabad was designated as the temporary joint capital for both states for a period not exceeding ten years, the residual state of Andhra Pradesh was left without a permanent administrative center of its own.³ This created an immediate and critical administrative vacuum and a political imperative for the newly configured Andhra Pradesh, comprising 13 districts, to identify and develop a new capital city.² The Reorganisation Act itself acknowledged this necessity, mandating the Union Government to provide support in this complex undertaking.²

The sudden absence of a capital following the 2014 bifurcation presented Andhra Pradesh with both a profound administrative challenge and a rare, albeit complex, opportunity. Unlike established state capitals that evolved organically over centuries, the imperative to build anew allowed for deliberate, modern planning from the ground up.³ This unique context framed the subsequent decisions, offering a chance for innovative urban design and potentially avoiding the infrastructural and spatial constraints often seen in older cities. However, it also carried immense financial burdens, execution risks, and the potential for significant social and environmental disruption, necessitating careful consideration and planning.⁵

B. The Sivaramakrishnan Committee: Guidance and Governmental Response

In accordance with Section 6 of the AP Reorganisation Act, 2014, the Union Government’s Ministry of Home Affairs constituted an Expert Committee on March 28, 2014, chaired by K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, former Secretary of Urban Development.¹ The committee, comprising experts from various national institutions like the School of Planning and Architecture, the Indian Institute of Human Settlements, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, and the National Institute of Urban Affairs, was tasked with studying alternatives for locating the new capital.³ Its mandate was comprehensive, requiring consideration of factors such as land availability, water resources, environmental sustainability, potential for urban growth, connectivity (rail, road, air), and, crucially, minimizing displacement of people, disruption to agriculture and the environment, and cost to the public exchequer.³

The Sivaramakrishnan Committee submitted its report in August 2014.⁷ A central finding was its strong advice against concentrating all capital functions within the highly fertile Vijayawada-Guntur-Tenali-Mangalagiri (VGTM) urban area.⁶ The Committee highlighted that this region, often referred to as the “rice bowl of AP” and one of India’s critical granaries, possessed some of the country’s best multi-cropped agricultural lands.⁵ Converting large tracts of this prime land (potentially 30,000 acres or more) for urban development was deemed a short-sighted policy that would displace a significant agricultural workforce, negatively impact food security, and primarily benefit land speculators.⁵ Furthermore, the Committee noted potential technical challenges, including a high water table and vulnerable soil types in the VGTM area, which could complicate construction and increase costs.⁶ Concentrating development here was also expected to severely strain existing infrastructure and lead to haphazard urban sprawl.⁶

Instead of a single, large capital city, the Committee strongly advocated for a strategy of decentralized development.² It proposed distributing government offices, directorates, and capital functions across three geographically distinct regions or “growth zones” within the state: the Vizag region (Uttarandhra), the Rayalaseema Arc (covering districts like Kurnool, Anantapur, Chittoor), and the Kalahasti-Nadikudi Spine.⁶ This approach, facilitated by modern digital connectivity and rapid transport, aimed to promote balanced regional growth, bring governance closer to the people across the state’s diverse regions, and mitigate the risks associated with concentrating resources in one location.⁵ The Committee even suggested specific departmental allocations suitable for each zone, aligning functions with regional strengths (e.g., industry-related offices in Vizag, agriculture in Prakasam).⁶

However, the Andhra Pradesh state government, then led by Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, largely chose to disregard the Sivaramakrishnan Committee’s core recommendations.⁸ Critics pointed out that even while the central committee was conducting its study, the state government formed its own committee headed by P. Narayana, the Minister for Municipal Administration, which included politicians and industrialists.⁵ This state-level committee reportedly never produced a formal report, leading to accusations that it served merely to lend credibility to a pre-determined decision by the Chief Minister to locate a centralised, riverfront capital in the fertile VGTM region, despite the expert committee’s warnings.⁵ On September 4, 2014, the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly passed a motion favouring the location of the capital city in the central part of the state, specifically around the Vijayawada-Guntur region.¹ While this motion also mentioned pursuing “decentralized development” through the creation of three Mega Cities and 14 smart cities across the state, this interpretation differed significantly from the Sivaramakrishnan Committee’s recommendation to decentralize the capital functions themselves.¹ This fundamental divergence between the expert committee’s advice (focused on decentralization, agricultural preservation, and cost-effectiveness) and the state government’s political decision (favouring a single, large capital in a fertile, central location) set the stage for much of the subsequent controversy, political instability, and legal challenges that would engulf the Amaravati project.⁸ The YSRCP government later used the Sivaramakrishnan report to bolster its own three-capitals proposal, highlighting the contested nature of the initial location choice.⁸

C. Amaravati’s Selection and the Initial Grand Vision

Following the Assembly motion and internal deliberations, the state government finalized its choice. On October 22, 2015, Chief Minister Naidu formally announced the selection of Amaravathi as the site for Andhra Pradesh’s new capital city.³ The name was deliberately chosen, evoking the rich history of the nearby ancient town of Amaravathi, a significant Buddhist site and the capital of the Satavahana dynasty nearly two millennia ago, situated on the banks of the Krishna River.³ The designated capital city area was located between the existing cities of Vijayawada and Guntur, also along the right bank of the Krishna River, southwest of Vijayawada.¹ It spanned 24 revenue villages and a portion of the Tadepalli Municipality in Guntur District, covering an initially identified area of 53,748 acres.¹

The official foundation stone laying ceremony for Amaravati took place on October 22, 2015, coinciding with the announcement. The event was marked by significant political presence, including the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, underscoring the project’s national importance.³ The initial vision articulated by the Naidu government was ambitious and grand. Amaravati was conceived not merely as an administrative center but as a futuristic, world-class, greenfield “people’s capital”.³ Plans aimed at creating an energy-efficient, sustainable, and vibrant urban hub, drawing inspiration from globally renowned planned cities like Singapore and Tokyo.³ It was intended to attract significant investment, foster industrial hubs, generate employment, and become a magnet for skilled professionals and businesses, thereby serving as a crucial engine for the state’s economic recovery and establishing a distinct identity for Andhra Pradesh after the bifurcation.³

The selection of the name “Amaravati” and the consistent emphasis on building a “world-class” city reflected a powerful aspirational narrative, aiming to connect the state’s future with a glorious historical past while signalling global ambition.³ This grand vision, however, stood in stark contrast to the more pragmatic and cautious recommendations of the Sivaramakrishnan Committee, which had prioritized cost-effectiveness, minimal disruption to agriculture, and decentralized development.⁵ This inherent tension between aspirational symbolism and pragmatic concerns arguably embedded a vulnerability within the project from its inception, making it susceptible to later criticisms regarding its scale, cost, and potential impact on regional equity.¹⁰

II. The Amaravati Blueprint: Master Plan and Urban Design

A. Planning Authority (APCRDA) and Master Plan Framework

To oversee the monumental task of building the new capital, the Andhra Pradesh government established the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority (APCRDA) through the APCRDA Act, 2014.³ This new body effectively replaced the pre-existing Vijayawada-Guntur-Tenali-Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority (VGTM UDA).¹⁵ The APCRDA was granted a broad mandate encompassing planning, coordination, execution, supervision, financing, funding, and promotion of the planned development for both the wider Capital Region and the specific Capital City Area.³

Reflecting the ambition for integrated regional development, APCRDA’s jurisdictional area was significantly expanded beyond the immediate capital site. Initially covering the 7,063 sq km of the expanded VGTM UDA, its boundaries were further redrawn to encompass a vast area of 8,352.69 sq km.¹⁵ This region spanned parts of Guntur, Krishna, NTR, Eluru, Palnadu, and Bapatla districts, including major existing urban centers like Vijayawada and Guntur.¹⁵ Within this larger region, the designated core Capital City area, the focus of the greenfield development, covered 217 sq km.¹² The extensive reach of APCRDA suggests a planning perspective aimed at managing growth and infrastructure not just within the new city but across the broader metropolitan region, potentially integrating Amaravati with its neighbouring urban areas.

The Master Plan specifically for the 217 sq km Amaravati Capital City was formally notified by APCRDA in February 2016.²⁰ This crucial document, outlining the spatial and functional layout of the future city, was crafted by the internationally acclaimed UK-based architectural and urban planning firm, Foster + Partners.¹⁴ To manage the implementation of development works within the Capital City area, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) named the Capital City Development and Management Corporation (CCDMC) was established under the Companies Act, 2013. It was later proposed that CCDMC be renamed the “Amaravati Development Company (ADC)”.¹⁶ This SPV was designated as the primary development agency responsible for executing trunk infrastructure projects like major roads, water treatment plants, power systems, government buildings, and flood management within the 217 sq km zone, operating under the overall planning and regulatory framework of APCRDA.¹⁶

B. Land Use Strategy: Zoning and the Nine Thematic Cities

The Amaravati Master Plan adopted a structured approach to land use and transportation. A gridiron pattern formed the basis of the transport network, featuring a clear hierarchy of roads ranging from major arterial roads (60 meters wide) and sub-arterial roads (50 m) down to collector streets (25 m) and local roads.¹⁴

A defining characteristic of the Master Plan was the division of the capital city into nine distinct thematic zones, often referred to as “theme cities”.¹⁴ This functional specialization aimed to create dedicated ecosystems for various sectors of governance, economy, and society. The nine designated themes were:

1. Government City: Planned over 1,093 hectares, this zone was intended to house the primary government offices, including the Legislature, Secretariat, High Court, Raj Bhavan, offices for Heads of Departments (HODs), and residential zones for VIPs and government officials.¹ The core government complex was planned near Rayapudi village.¹
2. Justice City: Spanning 1,339 hectares, this area was dedicated to judicial institutions, complementing the High Court location within the Government City.¹⁴
3. Finance City: Covering a significant 2,091 hectares, this zone aimed to become a major economic hub, accommodating commercial establishments, financial institutions, and associated residential spaces.¹⁴
4. Knowledge City: This zone focused on education and research. The plan allocated plots for educational institutions from primary schools to junior colleges within each neighbourhood. Several universities, including SRM University, VIT University, Amrita University, and the National Institute of Design (NID), became operational, hosting around 22,000 students. Further institutions like BITS Pilani (planning to start in 2026), XLRI, and collaborations with international universities (Purdue, Tokyo University, Georgia Tech) were envisioned.¹⁴
5. Health City: Dedicated plots for healthcare facilities were planned in each neighbourhood. A specialized Health City was designed to host major hospitals and related healthcare ecosystems. The All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) at Mangalagiri, within the broader capital region, was already functional.¹⁴
6. Sports City: Included in the blueprint to foster sports infrastructure and activities, contributing to a balanced urban environment.¹⁴
7. Tourism City: Designed to develop tourism infrastructure and attractions.¹⁴
8. Electronics City: Aimed at attracting investment and development in the electronics sector.¹⁴
9. Media City: Planned as a hub for media and communication industries.¹⁴

Beyond the theme cities, the overall capital city was planned to comprise 27 distinct townships, each approximately 1,000 acres in size and designed to house a population of 100,000-150,000 people. Each township was further subdivided into four neighbourhoods of roughly 250 acres each.¹⁴ This structured land use strategy, particularly the concept of theme cities, represented a deliberate attempt to attract specific industries and institutions by creating dedicated, synergistic zones. The goal extended beyond mere administration, aiming to cultivate a diversified economic base and generate employment opportunities, thereby driving the projected growth in GDP and population.¹⁴

C. Sustainable Design: Green and Blue Infrastructure Concepts

A strong emphasis on sustainability and environmental integration was woven into the Amaravati Master Plan.¹⁴ Drawing inspiration from global cities noted for their planning, such as Amsterdam and Singapore, the vision aimed for an energy-efficient and ecologically conscious urban environment.³ A key element was the incorporation of extensive “green and blue infrastructure”.¹⁴ This included the planned development of numerous water bodies, reservoirs (including three major ones for flood management), canals, parks, and extensive green spaces throughout the city.¹⁴

International expertise was sought to design these features effectively. Notably, the Netherlands-based consultancy firm Arcadis was involved in designing the green and blue network, aiming to enhance not only the city’s environmental resilience (e.g., flood management) but also its aesthetic appeal and overall livability.¹⁴ The plan also included provisions for sustainable utility management, such as the construction of thirteen decentralized sewage treatment plants (STPs) to serve the entire capital city and infrastructure for the reuse of treated wastewater, ensuring access to treated water supply and sewerage networks for all allotted land parcels.¹⁴

This focus on green and blue concepts, coupled with the engagement of international consultants, served a dual purpose. Practically, it aimed to create a more resilient, pleasant, and sustainable urban environment. Strategically, it helped brand Amaravati as a modern, forward-looking city committed to high standards of urban planning and environmental responsibility, potentially increasing its attractiveness to international investors, skilled professionals, and residents.¹⁴ However, the translation of these ambitious green and blue designs from plan to reality remained contingent on sustained funding and effective implementation, a process significantly challenged by the subsequent political disruptions and project halt.³

D. International Collaboration and Design Influence

The development of Amaravati involved significant international collaboration from its inception. The foundational Master Plan itself was crafted by Foster + Partners, a renowned UK-based firm with global experience in large-scale urban projects.¹⁴ Beyond the overall plan, specific development initiatives also sought international partnership. A notable example was the proposal submitted by a Singaporean consortium, comprising Ascendas-Singbridge Pte. Ltd. and Sembcorp Development Ltd., for the development of a 6.84 sq km “start-up area” within the Seed Capital region.²⁰ This proposal was pursued under the Swiss Challenge method, as per the Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling (APIDE) Act, 2001. The state government approved this proposal in July 2016, subsequently inviting competing counter-proposals through International Competitive Bidding (ICB).²⁰

The influence of Singapore, in particular, was prominent. The city-state served as an inspiration for Amaravati’s planning principles, and the Singapore government had assisted in preparing the original masterplan.¹⁴ Following the project’s revival in 2024, the Andhra Pradesh government actively re-engaged with the Singapore government, holding talks with a delegation to leverage their expertise once again.²³ The engagement with Singapore, widely recognized for its successful urban planning and economic development model, can be seen as a strategic move by the Andhra Pradesh government. It aimed not only to access technical expertise but also to signal openness to international best practices, enhance the project’s credibility on the global stage, and potentially attract significant foreign investment.²⁰ The “start-up area” concept proposed by the Singaporean consortium suggested a phased development approach, potentially creating an initial showcase to build momentum and attract further investment. The decision to re-engage post-2024 underscores the perceived value of this international partnership in realizing Amaravati’s ambitious goals.²³

III. Land Assembly: The Land Pooling Scheme (LPS)

A. LPS Framework: Voluntary Contribution and Compensation

Acquiring the vast expanse of land required for a greenfield capital city presented a significant challenge, particularly in a densely populated and agriculturally rich region like the VGTM area. To navigate this, the Naidu government adopted an innovative approach known as the Land Pooling Scheme (LPS), formalized under the APCRDA Act, 2014, and the associated Land Pooling Rules, 2015.¹ Instead of compulsory acquisition, the LPS relied on the voluntary participation of landowners.¹ Farmers and other landowners were invited to contribute their land parcels to a central pool managed by APCRDA.³

In return for surrendering their land, participants were promised a share in the future developed capital city. The core compensation package included:

1. Developed Reconstituted Plots: Landowners were promised smaller, but developed, plots of land within the planned capital city layout. These plots were typically a specified fraction of the original land surrendered (often cited as around one-fourth) and included both residential and commercial components, intended to provide a future source of livelihood and wealth generation.¹ The exact size and type of plot varied based on the nature (e.g., dry vs. wetland) and location of the original land surrendered.
2. Annuity Payments: To compensate for the loss of agricultural income during the development phase, landowners were promised annual payments (annuity) for a fixed period. This period was initially set at 10 years.³ Later, the YSRCP government announced an increase in the annuity amount (from Rs 2,500 to Rs 5,000 per month for certain farmers) and extended the payment term to 15 years.¹³

The LPS was presented as a “win-win” scenario, positioning landowners not as displaced persons but as active partners and stakeholders in the capital city’s development, poised to benefit from the anticipated appreciation in land value once the city was built.¹ This innovative approach sought to minimize conflict often associated with land acquisition and foster a sense of shared ownership in the project. However, the very structure of the LPS created an inherent risk: its success and the fulfillment of its promises were entirely contingent upon the government’s ability to successfully plan, fund, and execute the massive development project in a timely manner. Any significant delay or failure in delivering the developed plots and associated infrastructure would fundamentally undermine the agreement and potentially leave participating farmers in a precarious position, having given up their primary asset without receiving the promised future benefits.¹

B. Scale and Participation: Initial Phase (~34,000 Acres)

The government initially aimed to pool approximately 53,748 acres for the capital city project through the LPS, targeting land across 27 to 29 revenue villages in the Guntur district.¹ The scheme saw remarkable initial success. In the first phase, launched around 2015, the APCRDA managed to pool approximately 33,000 to 34,000 acres of land.¹ This significant land bank was voluntarily contributed by over 28,500 landowners from 24 revenue villages and parts of the Tadepalli Municipality.¹ Minister P Narayana recalled the speed of this process, stating that 34,000 acres were pooled in just 58 days in 2015.²⁷

In addition to the land pooled through the LPS, the state government also acquired control over roughly 16,000 acres of land within the capital region belonging to various government agencies, including endowment lands, forest lands, waqf properties, and poramboke (government-owned unassessed) lands.²⁵ This brought the total land bank available for the initial phase of Amaravati’s development to nearly 50,000 acres.²⁵ The high level of participation in the LPS, particularly in its early stages, indicated a degree of trust among landowners in the government’s vision and its ability to deliver on the promised benefits.

Crucially, the socio-economic profile of the participants reveals the scheme’s broad impact. Data presented in court proceedings indicated that as of May 2017, nearly 97 percent of the farmers who had surrendered their land under the LPS were classified as marginal or small landholders, possessing less than 5 acres each.¹ This demographic underscores the significance of the LPS promises. For this large majority of participants, their land often represented their primary, if not sole, significant asset and source of livelihood. Consequently, their decision to participate in the LPS represented a major leap of faith, making them particularly vulnerable to project delays or changes and heavily reliant on the timely fulfillment of the government’s commitments for their future economic security. This dependence helps explain the intensity and persistence of the farmer protests that erupted when the project was later stalled.¹²

C. Commitments to Landowners: Form 9.14 Agreements (Developed Plots, Annuity)

The specific terms and conditions governing the exchange of land under the LPS were formalized through a legally significant document: the Development Agreement-cum-Irrevocable General Power of Attorney, commonly referred to as Form 9.14, issued under the Land Pooling Scheme Rules, 2015.¹ This agreement was signed between the individual landowners and the APCRDA.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court later recognized Form 9.14 not merely as a procedural document but as a statutory contract, carrying legal weight and enforceability.¹ This interpretation became pivotal in subsequent legal challenges. The agreement explicitly detailed the government’s obligations, primarily:

• The return of developed, reconstituted plots (residential and commercial) to the landowners within the planned capital city layout.¹
• The payment of the agreed-upon annuity for the specified duration.³

Beyond these core compensation elements, Form 9.14, read in conjunction with Section 58 of the APCRDA Act and Rule 12(6) of the LPS Rules, implicitly but critically promised the development of essential infrastructure and basic amenities for the reconstituted plots and the surrounding capital city area. This included providing roads, drinking water supply, drainage systems, and electricity connections.¹ The initial project timelines, as per the agreement, aimed for completion of key infrastructure, including the government complex, by December 2018.¹

The legally binding nature of Form 9.14 meant that the government’s commitments were not just political promises but contractual obligations. Any deviation from these terms, particularly the failure to develop the capital city and provide the promised infrastructure and developed plots, could be construed as a breach of this statutory contract.¹ This legal foundation provided the farmers with strong grounds to challenge the subsequent government’s decision to halt the project and pursue the three-capital plan, framing it not just as a policy shift but as a violation of their legally protected rights.¹

D. Socio-Economic Dimensions and Farmer Concerns

The farmers participating in the LPS surrendered highly fertile, often multi-crop, agricultural land along the Krishna River banks – land that formed the bedrock of their livelihoods and local economy.⁵ They did so based on the compelling vision presented by the government: that sacrificing their current agricultural income would lead to greater future prosperity through ownership of valuable developed plots in a world-class capital city.¹ The anticipated influx of businesses, institutions, and residents was expected to drive up the value of their reconstituted plots significantly.⁴

The abrupt halt of the Amaravati project in 2019 and the subsequent proposal for three capitals shattered these expectations and triggered deep anxiety and economic hardship among the participating farmers and their families.¹² Having relinquished their agricultural lands, they faced the prospect of being left with neither their traditional source of income nor the promised valuable developed plots.¹² This perceived betrayal of the LPS agreement led to one of the most sustained protest movements in the state’s recent history. From late 2019 until the change of government in June 2024 (spanning 1,631 days), thousands of farmers, organized under banners like the Amaravati Parirakshana Samithi and Joint Action Committee (JAC), engaged in continuous demonstrations, rallies, and legal action.³ Their core demands were the fulfillment of the LPS promises, the completion of Amaravati’s development, and its retention as the sole capital of Andhra Pradesh.¹² The protests garnered support from opposition parties like the TDP, BJP, and JanaSena.⁷

Adding another layer of complexity and controversy were allegations of insider trading. The YSRCP government alleged that leaders and individuals associated with the previous TDP government had purchased land in the Amaravati region at low prices shortly before the official capital announcement, unfairly benefiting from the subsequent land value increase.¹² These allegations were used by the YSRCP to question the legitimacy of the Amaravati project itself and formed part of the justification for halting the works and initiating probes.¹³ While denied by the TDP, these claims fueled political acrimony surrounding the project. The LPS, therefore, became deeply intertwined with the economic fate and security of thousands of farming families, making the project’s political volatility a direct threat to their livelihoods and future prospects.¹²

E. Implementation Status and Legal Directives on Plot Delivery

While the initial land pooling process was relatively swift, the subsequent delivery of the promised developed plots lagged significantly. Although APCRDA proceeded with the demarcation and paper registration of many returnable plots (reports indicated 39,769 plots registered out of 64,709 allotted in 22 villages by early 2022 ¹), the crucial step of providing on-ground infrastructure – roads, water, electricity, drainage – stalled, especially after the 2019 change in government.¹ Without these basic amenities, the plots remained largely unusable and failed to deliver the value promised under the LPS.¹

This gap between paper allocation and tangible development became a central issue in the legal challenges. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in its March 3, 2022 judgment, specifically addressed this failure. Recognizing the government’s contractual obligations under Form 9.14 and the APCRDA Act, the Court issued clear directives ¹:

• The State and APCRDA must complete the process of development and provide basic amenities (roads, drinking water, drainage, electricity) in the Amaravati Capital City and Region as per the Act and LPS Rules.¹
• They must deliver and hand over the developed reconstituted plots, on the ground, to the landholders who surrendered their land, within a strict timeline of three months (i.e., by June 3, 2022).¹
• Furthermore, the Court directed the State to construct and develop the Amaravati capital city and region within six months, fulfilling the terms of the Development Agreement.¹

While the state government (YSRCP) appealed the High Court’s order to the Supreme Court, it specifically obtained a stay only on the six-month deadline for overall capital region development, with the Supreme Court questioning the judiciary’s role in setting such executive timelines.¹² The obligation to deliver developed plots remained legally underscored. Following the change in government in 2024, the new administration explicitly reaffirmed its commitment to fulfilling the LPS promises and complying with the High Court’s directions regarding plot development and delivery, albeit requesting modified timelines from the Supreme Court.²² The core failure highlighted by the courts and protests was thus not merely about plot allocation on paper, but the critical lack of development that rendered these plots unusable and breached the fundamental premise of the LPS agreement.¹

F. Proposed Expansion: Phase II Land Pooling Considerations

With the revival of the Amaravati project under the TDP-led government post-June 2024, ambitious plans for expansion quickly emerged. Reports in early 2025 indicated that the state government was actively considering acquiring a substantial amount of additional land, estimated between 30,000 and 40,000 acres.²³ This proposed “Phase II” of land acquisition targeted approximately 11 villages situated on the periphery of the original 29-village core capital city area.²⁵

The rationale presented for this significant expansion included several factors:

• Meeting Growing Demand: Addressing increasing requests for land allocation from various institutions and private firms looking to establish a presence in the capital region.²⁵
• Supporting New Infrastructure: Acquiring land for major new infrastructure projects, most notably a proposed international airport requiring an estimated 5,000 acres, as well as additional ring roads and highways.²³
• Creating a Land Bank: Building a reserve of government-controlled land for future development needs and, significantly, for potential monetization (sale or lease) to help repay the large debts incurred for the capital’s construction.²⁵
• Realizing the “Mega City” Vision: Expanding the capital’s footprint to integrate surrounding areas like Mangalagiri, Tadepalli, Guntur, and Vijayawada, transforming Amaravati into a larger metropolitan entity.²⁵

The government was reportedly evaluating whether to pursue this new land acquisition through another Land Pooling Scheme (LPS) or via traditional land acquisition methods.²⁷ Ministers suggested that farmers in the targeted areas might prefer the LPS model, believing it offers better long-term financial returns compared to the standard compensation (typically based on registration value) provided under land acquisition.²⁷ However, as of April 2025, no final decision on the acquisition method, the exact acreage, or the specific terms had been announced.²⁷

This proposal for a second major phase of land pooling, potentially doubling the land area under APCRDA’s direct control, represents a significant scaling up of the Amaravati vision. It also raises important considerations. Launching another large-scale pooling effort requires navigating the legacy of the first phase, where delays and policy reversals damaged trust between the government and participating farmers.¹² Successfully implementing Phase II likely hinges on demonstrating tangible progress in fulfilling commitments from Phase I and ensuring transparency, particularly regarding the use of pooled land for debt monetization ²⁵, to rebuild confidence among potential new participants.

Table 1: Comparison of Amaravati Land Pooling Scheme Phases

Feature	Phase I (Actual)	Phase II (Proposed, as of early 2025)
Target Area (Acres)	~54,000 (aimed), ~34,000 (pooled) 1	30,000 – 40,000 23
Location	Core Capital Region (29 villages initially targeted) 1	Periphery (11 villages outside core) 25
Primary Rationale	Greenfield Capital City Development 3	Expansion, Institutional Demand, Infrastructure (Airport), Land Bank/Monetization 25
Method	Voluntary LPS (Form 9.14) 1	LPS vs Acquisition (Decision Pending) 27
Compensation	Developed Plots (Res/Comm), Annuity (10/15 yrs) 1	TBD (Likely similar benefits if LPS) 31
Current Status	Pooled, Development stalled then restarted, Legal mandates for plot delivery 1	Under Consideration / Planning 31

IV. Infrastructure Development: Ambition vs. Reality

A. Planned Infrastructure Portfolio (Transport, Utilities, Govt. Buildings, Social)

The Amaravati Master Plan envisioned the creation of a comprehensive infrastructure network necessary for a modern capital city built from scratch. The portfolio of planned projects was extensive, covering multiple sectors ¹:

• Transport Infrastructure: This included a hierarchical road network featuring the Amaravati Seed Access Road, major arterial roads, collector roads, and local streets.³ Plans also incorporated inner and outer ring roads to facilitate circulation within and access to the capital region, new highways and expressways connecting Amaravati to Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam, and other key locations, and bridges where necessary.¹
• Utilities: Essential services infrastructure formed a major component. This involved developing a robust water supply system, including the construction of water treatment plants and three large reservoirs integrated with a Krishna River flood management plan.¹⁴ Comprehensive drainage systems and sewerage networks, supported by 13 decentralized Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) with provisions for treated wastewater reuse, were also planned.¹ Reliable power infrastructure was another critical element.¹
• Government Buildings: As the state capital, Amaravati required numerous administrative and governmental structures. Plans included permanent buildings for the State Legislature (Assembly and Council), the Secretariat complex housing government departments, a new High Court building, the Raj Bhavan (Governor’s residence), and housing complexes for Ministers, MLAs, MLCs, High Court Judges, senior IAS and IPS officers, and other government employees (like the initiated Group-D officers’ buildings and MLA/MLC housing at Rayapudi).¹
• Social Infrastructure: The plan aimed to create a livable city with high-quality social amenities. This involved allocating land and planning for schools (primary to junior college level in each neighbourhood), healthcare facilities (clinics in neighbourhoods and a dedicated Health City), and higher education institutions within the Knowledge City.¹⁴
• Public Spaces: Significant emphasis was placed on creating parks, plazas, and extensive green spaces throughout the city, contributing to the “green and blue” infrastructure concept.¹⁴

B. Project Execution: Progress, Stoppages (2019-2024), and Revival

Following the foundation laying in 2015, initial construction activities commenced in Amaravati. Some key structures began to take shape or became functional during the first few years (2015-2019). These included the interim government complex at Velagapudi (allowing the state administration to shift from Hyderabad), the construction of a new High Court building (though users later reported issues with facilities like broadband access ³), and the establishment of campuses by private universities such as VIT, SRM, and Amrita within the designated Knowledge City zone.³ Several housing projects for officials and legislators were also initiated.³

However, this initial momentum came to a grinding halt following the state assembly elections in May 2019, which brought the YSRCP government to power.³ Citing intentions to review all projects initiated by the previous government, alleging irregularities and insider trading in the Amaravati project, and ultimately proposing the three-capital model, the new administration effectively abandoned the ongoing development works in Amaravati.³ Construction activities ceased, payments to contractors were reportedly stopped, and the ambitious capital city project was put on the back burner for nearly five years (mid-2019 to mid-2024).³ Many partially constructed buildings and infrastructure projects were left unfinished during this period.

The political landscape shifted again with the 2024 assembly elections, which saw the return of the TDP-led alliance and N. Chandrababu Naidu as Chief Minister.¹² Fulfilling a key electoral promise, the new government immediately prioritized the revival of the Amaravati project.²³ Works that had been stalled for five years were formally restarted, symbolized by the Chief Minister’s participation in a ceremony at the CRDA project office site in Rayapudi in October 2024.³⁴

C. Recent Tendering and Construction Activity (Post-June 2024)

Since taking office in June 2024, the Naidu government has moved swiftly to inject momentum back into the Amaravati project, putting it on a fast track.²³ A significant volume of tendering activity was undertaken by the APCRDA (or the functionally equivalent body) to restart and award contracts for the stalled works. Reports from late 2024 and early 2025 indicated substantial progress on this front:

• One report mentioned 59 tenders for developmental works worth Rs 37,702.15 crore being cleared by APCRDA.²³
• Other reports cited 68 projects with finalized tenders valued at Rs 42,360 crore.³¹ These figures likely overlap significantly and represent a major push to get contractors mobilized.
• The scope of these tenders covered a wide range of essential infrastructure, including the construction and upgradation of roads and bridges, water supply systems, the three planned reservoirs for flood management, and the development of parks and green spaces.²³
• Approvals were also granted for the construction of permanent buildings for the State Assembly (estimated cost Rs 617 crore) and the High Court (estimated cost Rs 786 crore).³⁷

Physical construction work visibly recommenced on the ground.³⁴ To support the large-scale construction needs, the state’s Mining Department allocated 851 acres to CRDA for sourcing gravel.³¹ A significant workforce, estimated at around 20,000 workers primarily from other states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Odisha, was expected to be engaged in the revived construction efforts.²⁴

Reflecting the urgency, the government announced highly ambitious timelines for completing key components of the capital city ²⁷:

• Residences for officials: within 1 year.
• Trunk roads (major arterial routes): within 1.5 years.
• Layout roads (within neighbourhoods): within 2.5 years.
• Iconic buildings (like Assembly, High Court, Secretariat): within 3 years (some reports specified 24-36 months for Assembly/HC ¹⁴).
• The CRDA office building itself was targeted for completion within 4 months of work restarting.³⁴

To mark the official relaunch of the works and signal high-level commitment, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was invited to visit Amaravati, potentially in May 2025.¹⁴ While these timelines demonstrate strong political will, achieving them for a complex, large-scale greenfield project, especially after a five-year disruption, presents a formidable execution challenge. Success will depend critically on efficient project management, sustained funding flows, and effective coordination among numerous contractors and agencies.³²

D. The Proposed International Airport Project

A significant addition to the revived Amaravati blueprint is the proposal for a dedicated international airport within the capital region.²³ This project, envisioned to cover approximately 5,000 acres, is a key component of the government’s plan to develop Amaravati into a “mega city” and enhance its connectivity.²⁷

The primary justifications for this new airport are twofold ²³:

1. To provide direct, quick, and convenient air access to the state capital for government officials, business travellers, investors, and residents.
2. To anticipate and alleviate potential future congestion at the existing nearest airport located in Vijayawada (Gannavaram), which might become overburdened as the capital region grows.

As of early 2025, the international airport project was still in the planning and preparatory stages. The APCRDA was actively scouting for suitable land within the capital region, particularly in the Guntur and Krishna districts.²³ A key pending decision was the method for acquiring the necessary 5,000+ acres: whether through the proposed Phase II Land Pooling Scheme or via direct land acquisition.²⁷ The state government indicated a preference might exist among farmers for land pooling due to potentially better returns, but no final decision had been made.²⁷ The inclusion of an international airport project at this stage, while the core city development is still restarting, signals a strategy of building infrastructure ahead of immediate demand, anticipating rapid growth for Amaravati. It represents a significant long-term investment aimed at positioning the capital as a major national and potentially international hub, but also carries the risk associated with large infrastructure projects built on future projections.

E. Financial Implications: Cost Escalations due to Delays

The five-year interruption in Amaravati’s development (2019-2024) had significant financial consequences beyond just lost time. Chief Minister Naidu explicitly stated in October 2024 that the estimated cost to complete the 55 major works for which tenders were originally called between 2014 and 2019 (at a cost of Rs 42,519 crore) had inflated by approximately Rs 7,000 crore.³⁴ This pushed the revised estimate for completing just those initial works to Rs 52,000 crore.³⁴

This cost escalation can be attributed to several factors arising from the prolonged delay, including general inflation impacting material and labour costs, the potential need for renegotiating contracts with suppliers and construction firms, costs associated with remobilizing resources, and potential expenses for assessing and repairing any degradation of partially completed structures during the hiatus.

Overall project cost estimates mentioned in 2025 reflect these increased figures. Some reports cited an estimated budget of Rs 64,910 crore (approx. Rs 65,000 crore) for the developmental works in Phase 1, targeted for completion over the next three years.¹⁴ Other sources mentioned that the total value of the restarted works was estimated at Rs 1 lakh crore, possibly encompassing a broader scope or longer timeframe.²³ Regardless of the precise figure, it is clear that the political uncertainty and resulting project stoppage imposed a substantial financial penalty, increasing the burden on the state exchequer and necessitating larger funding mobilization efforts for the project’s revival.

Table 2: Status of Key Amaravati Infrastructure Projects (as of late 2024/early 2025)

Project/Category	Scope/Details	Original Cost Est. (Pre-2019)	Revised Cost Est. (Post-2024)	Current Status (Apr 2025)	Projected Timeline
Initial 55 Tendered Works (Overall)	Roads, basic infra, initial buildings	Rs 42,519 Cr 34	Rs 52,000 Cr 34	Restarted 34	Varies (see below)
CRDA Project Office Building	7-storey building	Rs 160 Cr 34	Included above?	Restarted, completion aimed 34	~4 months (from Oct 2024)
Officials’ Residences	Housing for Govt. officials	Included above?	Included above?	Tenders finalized/Work underway 31	1 year 32
Trunk Roads	Major arterial roads	Included above?	Included above?	Tenders finalized/Work underway 31	1.5 years 32
Layout Roads	Roads within developed plots/neighbourhoods	Included above?	Included above?	Tenders finalized/Work underway 31	2.5 years 32
Iconic Buildings (Assembly, HC etc.)	Legislature, High Court, Secretariat	Part of ~Rs 48k Cr package? 24	Assembly: Rs 617 Cr? 37 HC: Rs 786 Cr? 37	Tenders finalized/Approved 31	3 years 32 (Assembly/HC 24-36 months 14)
Water Supply / Reservoirs	Water treatment, distribution, 3 reservoirs	Included in Rs 37.7k Cr batch 23	Included in Rs 37.7k Cr batch 23	Tenders finalized/Work underway 23	Part of Phase 1 (3 years) 14
Parks/Green Spaces	Landscaping, urban greenery	Included in Rs 37.7k Cr batch 23	Included in Rs 37.7k Cr batch 23	Tenders finalized/Work underway 23	Part of Phase 1 (3 years) 14
International Airport	New airport (~5000 acres)	N/A	TBD	Proposed, Land scouting/pooling decision pending 23	TBD

V. Economic Strategy and Financial Framework

A. Amaravati’s Economic Vision: Industries, Investment, and Employment

From its conception, Amaravati was envisioned as more than just an administrative capital; it was intended to be a powerful engine of economic growth for Andhra Pradesh.¹⁴ The strategy aimed to create a diversified and dynamic economic base capable of generating substantial employment and contributing significantly to the state’s GDP. The Master Plan’s division into nine thematic cities (Finance, Knowledge, Health, Electronics, Media, Tourism, Sports, Government, Justice) was central to this vision.¹⁴ Each theme city was designed to act as a specialized hub, creating an ecosystem to attract anchor investors, related industries, and skilled professionals in that particular sector.¹⁴

The Knowledge City, for instance, was anchored by the presence of established universities like VIT, SRM, Amrita, and NID, with plans to attract further prestigious national and international institutions.¹⁴ Similarly, the Health City aimed to cluster major hospitals and healthcare services, while the Finance and Electronics cities targeted investment in those specific high-growth sectors.¹⁴ The overarching goal was to leverage the new capital’s infrastructure and planned environment to attract significant private sector participation and investment.¹⁴

The economic projections associated with this vision were ambitious: the plan aimed for Amaravati to eventually house a population of 3.5 million people, create 1.5 million jobs, and achieve a GDP of USD 35 billion by the year 2050.¹⁴ A key aspect of the long-term financial strategy was the idea that Amaravati would become a “self-financing” city.³⁴ This relied on the premise that after developing the basic infrastructure and returning plots to LPS participants, the remaining land held by APCRDA could be strategically monetized (sold or leased) at appreciated values. The revenue generated from this land was expected to help recover development costs and potentially fund further expansion.²⁵ The scale of this economic vision, however, clearly indicated that its realization would depend heavily on attracting massive private investment, far exceeding the capacity of public funds alone. The success of the theme cities and the achievement of the job and GDP targets were therefore contingent on the government’s ability to create a stable, attractive investment climate and effectively market the opportunities within Amaravati to domestic and international businesses.¹⁴

B. Funding the Capital: Sources and Commitments (Govt. Funds, Loans, Bonds, PPP)

Financing the construction of a greenfield capital city of Amaravati’s scale required mobilizing substantial resources from diverse sources. The financial framework relied on a combination of government support, multilateral loans, domestic borrowings, and anticipated private investment ¹⁴:

• Central Government Support: The Government of India committed significant financial assistance, reported as Rs 15,000 crore in 2024/2025 assessments.¹⁴
• Multilateral Development Banks: Agreements were signed with major international financial institutions. The World Bank approved support to the tune of USD 800 million, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) committed a similar amount (USD 789-800 million).¹⁴ These loans typically fund specific infrastructure components.
• Domestic Financial Institutions: The state government sought substantial loans from domestic institutions. HUDCO (Housing and Urban Development Corporation) was expected to provide around Rs 11,000 crore.²³ APCRDA (and its successor/predecessor AMRDA) also sought term loans from commercial banks, often backed by state government guarantees. For example, AMRDA sought Rs 3,000 crore from banks for infrastructure development ³⁸, and outstanding bank loans (excluding bonds) were reported at Rs 2,980 crore as of March 2020.¹⁸
• Bond Issuance: APCRDA/AMRDA raised funds by issuing bonds in the market. These bonds were also typically guaranteed by the state government, making them attractive to investors but adding to the state’s contingent liabilities.¹⁸
• Public-Private Partnerships (PPP): The development model explicitly included promoting PPP projects, particularly for infrastructure and potentially within the theme cities. Mechanisms like Annuity, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) were considered, with plans for a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to manage Viability Gap Funding (VGF) if needed.¹⁴
• Land Monetization: As mentioned, the long-term strategy involved generating revenue by monetizing the land bank remaining with APCRDA after fulfilling LPS obligations.²⁵

This multi-pronged funding strategy highlights the project’s massive financial requirements. However, the significant reliance on loans and state-guaranteed bonds created a substantial debt burden for Andhra Pradesh.¹⁸ This became particularly challenging during the 2019-2024 period when development stalled. The state government remained obligated to service the debt incurred for Amaravati, even though the project was not progressing and generating the anticipated revenues from land monetization or economic activity.¹⁸ This financial pressure was exacerbated by the state’s already high overall debt levels, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability.¹⁸ The successful revival of the project now depends not only on executing construction but also on managing this accumulated debt and ensuring the future revenue streams materialize as planned.

Table 3: Overview of Major Funding Sources for Amaravati Project

Funding Source	Type	Amount Committed/Expected	Status/Notes (as of early 2025)
Government of India	Grant/Assistance	Rs 15,000 Crore 14	Committed
World Bank	Loan	USD 800 Million 14	Agreement signed/Approved
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Loan	USD 789-800 Million 14	Agreement signed/Approved
HUDCO	Loan	Rs 11,000 Crore 23	Expected/Sought
Banks (Consortium)	Loan (to APCRDA/AMRDA)	Rs 3,000 Cr (example sought) 38; Rs 2980 Cr outstanding (Mar 2020, ex-bonds) 18	Sought/Partially Availed, State Guaranteed
APCRDA/AMRDA Bonds	Bonds	Amount TBD (Rated by agencies 18)	Issued, State Guaranteed 18
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)	Investment	TBD	Envisioned, SPV planned for VGF 14
Land Monetization	Revenue Generation	TBD	Planned as long-term “self-financing” mechanism 25

C. Implementation Architecture: Role of APCRDA, AMRDA, ADC

The institutional framework designed to deliver the Amaravati project evolved significantly, mirroring the political shifts. Initially, the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority (APCRDA), established by the APCRDA Act of 2014, served as the apex body.³ It held the primary responsibility for overall planning, regulation, coordination, and financing for the entire Capital Region.¹⁶ For the specific task of implementing development works within the 217 sq km Capital City area, a dedicated SPV, the Capital City Development & Management Corporation (CCDMC), was created under the Companies Act.¹⁶ CCDMC (proposed to be renamed Amaravati Development Company – ADC) was intended to handle the execution of major infrastructure projects, potentially engaging staff on deputation and hiring professionals from the market, and utilizing PPP models where feasible.¹⁶

This structure was dismantled in 2020 by the YSRCP government. Through the APCRDA (Repeal) Act, 2020, the APCRDA itself was abolished.¹¹ It was replaced by the Amaravati Metropolitan Region Development Authority (AMRDA), established under a separate Act (often cited as ACT No. 27 of 2020, though the repeal act itself led to AMRDA’s formation).¹⁹ AMRDA inherited the jurisdiction, assets, and liabilities (including the government-guaranteed bonds) of the former APCRDA.¹⁸ The leadership structure also changed, with the Chief Minister and Municipal Administration Minister, who chaired the APCRDA, potentially not holding the same positions in AMRDA, which was headed by a Metropolitan Commissioner.³⁹

Following the return of the TDP-led government in 2024 and the reinstatement of Amaravati as the sole capital, the institutional situation appeared to revert functionally, if not entirely legally immediately, to the original structure. References in government communications and news reports post-June 2024 frequently mention APCRDA or CRDA as the active authority managing the revived project, finalizing tenders, and overseeing construction.¹⁴ While the precise legal status (whether the 2014 APCRDA Act was formally revived or if AMRDA continues to exist but operates under the original mandate) requires definitive clarification, the operational reality points towards the restoration of APCRDA’s functions and objectives. Key executives, such as the Commissioner, continue to lead the authority’s operations.¹⁵ The frequent changes in the name, legal status, and leadership of the primary development authority (APCRDA -> AMRDA -> functionally APCRDA again) inevitably created periods of institutional instability. This “institutional whiplash” likely complicated administration, contract management, staff morale, and stakeholder communication during the transition periods, potentially hindering operational efficiency and affecting investor perceptions of stability.

VI. Navigating Political Shifts and Legal Hurdles

A. The Decentralization Detour: The Three-Capital Plan (2019-2024)

The trajectory of Amaravati’s development was fundamentally altered following the change in state government in May 2019. The newly elected YSRCP government, led by Chief Minister Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, expressed skepticism about the Amaravati project from the outset, halting ongoing works and launching reviews.³ In December 2019, the government formally announced a radical policy shift: the decentralization of state capital functions across three cities.¹²

This “three-capital plan” proposed ¹:

• Amaravati: To be retained only as the Legislative Capital, hosting the State Assembly.
• Visakhapatnam (Vizag): To become the Executive Capital, housing the State Secretariat and the Chief Minister’s office, effectively becoming the seat of government administration.
• Kurnool: To be designated as the Judicial Capital, where the state High Court would be relocated.

The government justified this move by citing the need for balanced development across Andhra Pradesh’s distinct regions (Coastal Andhra, Uttarandhra, and Rayalaseema), arguing that concentrating all development in Amaravati would neglect other areas.¹³ They also referenced the Sivaramakrishnan Committee’s earlier recommendations for decentralization and pointed to alleged financial irregularities and insider trading associated with the Amaravati project under the previous regime as reasons for the policy change.⁸

This decision represented a complete political reversal of the previous government’s single-capital policy and posed an existential threat to the Amaravati project as originally conceived.¹⁴ It immediately triggered fierce opposition, particularly from the thousands of farmers who had contributed land under the LPS, plunging the future of the capital city into uncertainty for the next five years.¹² The move appeared driven primarily by the new government’s political priorities, including a desire to differentiate itself from its predecessor, address regional political considerations, and counter the perceived concentration of resources and influence in the Amaravati region.⁸ This political decision, more than any technical or purely financial factor, became the single most significant disruptor for the Amaravati project.

B. Legislative Flux: Enactment and Repeal of Key Acts

To provide legal backing for the three-capital plan, the YSRCP government introduced and passed two crucial pieces of legislation in the State Assembly in January and June 2020 ¹³:

1. The Andhra Pradesh Decentralisation and Inclusive Development of All Regions Act, 2020: This Act formally established the framework for the three capitals (Legislative – Amaravati, Executive – Visakhapatnam, Judicial – Kurnool).¹
2. The Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority (Repeal) Act, 2020: This Act abolished the APCRDA, the body created to develop Amaravati, paving the way for its replacement by AMRDA.¹

The passage of these bills was contentious, facing strong opposition, particularly in the Legislative Council where the TDP held a majority initially.²⁶ Despite these hurdles, the Acts eventually received the Governor’s assent on July 31, 2020, and were notified in the official gazette, formally bringing the three-capital policy into law.¹¹

However, these Acts immediately faced numerous legal challenges in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.⁴ As the court proceedings advanced and amid sustained protests, the Jagan Mohan Reddy government made a surprising move in November 2021. It introduced and passed bills in the Assembly to repeal both the Decentralisation Act and the APCRDA Repeal Act.⁴ The Advocate General formally informed the High Court of this decision.²⁶

While this repeal technically removed the legal basis for the three-capital system, Chief Minister Jagan Mohan Reddy clarified on the floor of the Assembly that the withdrawal was intended to address perceived distortions, misinformation, and legal hurdles.⁷ He explicitly stated that the government intended to bring back a “better,” “more comprehensive,” and “complete” decentralization bill after further consultations, indicating that the policy goal of three capitals had not been abandoned.⁷ This suggested the repeal was likely a strategic retreat to navigate the ongoing, potentially unfavorable, court proceedings concerning the specific 2020 Acts, rather than a fundamental change in the government’s policy direction. The YSRCP continued to advocate for Visakhapatnam as the executive capital even after the repeal.⁴ However, no new decentralization bill was introduced before the 2024 elections.

C. Judicial Intervention: High Court Mandates and Rulings

The Andhra Pradesh High Court played a critical role in the Amaravati saga. Numerous writ petitions were filed before it, primarily by farmers who had participated in the Land Pooling Scheme, challenging the constitutional validity and legality of the Decentralisation Act and the APCRDA Repeal Act.¹ During the lengthy hearings, the High Court issued interim orders directing the state government to maintain the status quo regarding the shifting of any government offices from Amaravati.¹²

Even after the state government repealed the two contentious Acts in November 2021, the High Court continued hearing the petitions, as petitioners argued that several underlying issues related to the APCRDA Act and the government’s commitments remained unresolved.⁴⁴ On March 3, 2022, a full bench of the High Court delivered a landmark judgment that decisively favoured the continuation of Amaravati as the sole capital.¹

The key findings and directives of the High Court were ¹:

• Legislative Competence: The Court held that the State Legislature lacked the competence to enact any legislation for shifting, bifurcating, or trifurcating the capital city, its core functions (Legislature, Executive, Judiciary), or the Heads of Departments to any area other than the Capital City (Amaravati) as notified under the APCRDA Act, 2014.
• Binding Nature of Commitments: The Court strongly affirmed that the State and APCRDA were bound by the provisions of the APCRDA Act, 2014, and the Land Pooling Scheme Rules, 2015. The Development Agreements (Form 9.14) signed with farmers were deemed statutory contracts that the government was obligated to honor.
• Promissory Estoppel and Farmer Rights: The Court invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel, stating that the government could not go back on its promise to develop Amaravati after thousands of farmers had surrendered their valuable agricultural land based on that promise. It ruled that denying the promised development violated the farmers’ fundamental rights under Articles 14 (Equality), 21 (Life and Liberty), and 300-A (Property) of the Constitution.
• Use of Pooled Land: The Court declared that the land pooled under the LPS was acquired for the specific purpose of developing the capital city and could not be alienated, mortgaged, or used for any other purpose (like selling to private industries or building housing for unrelated schemes) without fulfilling the original commitment.
• Mandate for Development: The Court issued specific, time-bound directions (a continuous mandamus) ordering the State and APCRDA to:

• Complete the development of infrastructure and basic amenities (roads, water, drainage, electricity) in the Amaravati Capital City and Region.
• Hand over the developed, reconstituted plots to the participating landholders within three months (by June 3, 2022).
• Construct and develop the Amaravati capital city and region as per the Master Plan and LPS agreements within six months.

This comprehensive judgment effectively nullified the three-capital policy (even after its legislative repeal) and provided strong legal backing for Amaravati’s status as the single capital, heavily emphasizing the state’s binding statutory and contractual obligations towards the farmers who participated in the LPS.

D. Supreme Court Proceedings and the Path to Resolution

Unwilling to accept the High Court’s verdict, the YSRCP state government challenged the March 3, 2022 order by filing a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court of India.⁴ In November 2022, the Supreme Court heard preliminary arguments. While it did not grant a stay on the High Court’s core findings regarding Amaravati’s status or the need to fulfill LPS commitments, it did put a stay specifically on the directive requiring the state to complete all infrastructure development within the stringent six-month timeframe.¹² The bench questioned the appropriateness of the High Court setting such a tight, executive-like deadline, remarking on the separation of powers.¹²

The case remained pending before the Supreme Court, with hearings scheduled intermittently (e.g., July 11, 2023; April 2024) but without a final resolution on the merits of the state’s appeal.⁴ The legal ambiguity persisted, although the High Court’s order largely remained operative, barring the specific six-month completion mandate.

The ultimate resolution of this legal battle came not through a final judicial verdict from the Supreme Court, but as a direct consequence of the political change following the Andhra Pradesh Assembly elections in May-June 2024. The TDP-led alliance, having campaigned on the promise of restoring Amaravati, came to power.³⁶ In December 2024, the new state government, under Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, took decisive action to end the legal uncertainty. It filed a formal affidavit in the Supreme Court ²²:

• Affirming the state’s policy decision to develop Amaravati as the single, sole capital of Andhra Pradesh, housing all three wings of governance (Legislature, Executive, Judiciary).
• Stating its intention to comply with the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s March 2022 judgment regarding the development of Amaravati and fulfilling commitments under the LPS and APCRDA Act.
• Requesting the Supreme Court to grant a modified, more realistic schedule for completing the development works mandated by the High Court.
• Urging the Supreme Court to dispose of the SLP filed by the previous YSRCP government, as the current government no longer wished to pursue the challenge.

This affidavit effectively represented the state government withdrawing its appeal and accepting the High Court’s verdict. This political decision brought legal finality to the three-capital dispute, clearing the path for the undisputed development of Amaravati as the sole capital city, contingent only on the Supreme Court potentially modifying the completion timelines.

VII. Amaravati Revived: Current Status and Future Trajectory

A. Policy Reversal: Reinstatement as the Sole Capital

The results of the 2024 Andhra Pradesh Assembly elections marked a definitive turning point for Amaravati. The TDP-led coalition secured a decisive victory, and N. Chandrababu Naidu returned as Chief Minister.¹² Immediately upon assuming office, Naidu unequivocally declared that Amaravati would be developed as the single, unified capital of the state, explicitly rejecting the previous government’s three-capital formula and stating there would be no more “games” regarding the capital’s status.¹²

This policy stance was swiftly followed by concrete action. The long-running protests by Amaravati farmers, which had persisted for 1,631 days demanding the retention of Amaravati as the sole capital, were formally concluded on June 12, 2024, the day Naidu was sworn in.¹² The state government then formalized its position legally through the affidavit filed in the Supreme Court in December 2024, confirming Amaravati as the sole capital and committing to its development as per the original master plan and LPS agreements.²² This sequence of events brought an end to the five years of policy ambiguity and political conflict surrounding the state capital, firmly reinstating the original vision for Amaravati.

B. Resumption of Development Activities and Timelines

As detailed previously (Section IV.C), the reinstatement of Amaravati was accompanied by immediate efforts to restart the stalled development activities. Construction work physically resumed on various project sites, including the CRDA office building.³⁴ A significant number of tenders, covering major infrastructure components like roads, water supply, government buildings (including the Assembly and High Court), and public spaces, were finalized and awarded, representing investments worth tens of thousands of crores.²³

The government signaled its intent to pursue development with urgency by announcing ambitious completion timelines for key infrastructure elements, generally ranging from one to three years.³² The overarching goal communicated was to bring a “proper tangible structure” to Amaravati within the government’s current term, focusing initially on completing basic infrastructure (Phase 1 estimated at Rs 65,000 crore over three years ¹⁴), core government buildings, and, critically, delivering the developed plots promised to the farmers under the Land Pooling Scheme.¹⁴

C. Enduring Challenges and Strategic Opportunities

Despite the renewed political will and clarity on Amaravati’s status, significant challenges lie ahead on the path to realizing the vision. Key hurdles include:

• Funding Mobilization: Securing the enormous financial resources required remains a major challenge. While commitments exist from the Centre and multilateral agencies ²⁴, ensuring timely disbursal and potentially raising further funds (estimated Rs 65,000 Cr+ for Phase 1 alone ¹⁴) in a fiscally constrained environment will be critical.
• Debt Management: The project carries substantial debt accumulated from previous loans and bond issues, often guaranteed by the state.¹⁸ Managing this debt burden while investing heavily in new construction requires careful financial planning.
• Execution Capacity: Delivering on the ambitious construction timelines ³² demands exceptional project management and execution capacity from APCRDA and its contractors, especially given the complexity of coordinating numerous large contracts simultaneously after a long hiatus. Overcoming potential bureaucratic hurdles and ensuring quality control will be vital.
• Land Acquisition (Phase II): The proposed acquisition of an additional 30,000-40,000 acres ²⁵ presents its own set of challenges, requiring sensitive negotiations with landowners and careful consideration of the chosen method (LPS vs. acquisition) to avoid reigniting land-related conflicts.
• Investor Confidence: Rebuilding confidence among private investors after years of policy volatility is crucial for attracting the investment needed to drive the economic vision of the theme cities and achieve the “self-financing” goal.¹⁴
• Regional Balance: The underlying issue of ensuring equitable development across all regions of Andhra Pradesh (Uttarandhra and Rayalaseema), which fueled the three-capital debate, remains a critical governance challenge.¹⁰ The government needs to demonstrate tangible progress in other regions alongside Amaravati’s development to maintain political stability and address regional aspirations.²²

Alongside these challenges, significant opportunities exist. The project benefits from a large, already assembled land bank through the initial LPS.²⁵ A comprehensive master plan, developed with international expertise, provides a ready blueprint.¹⁴ The concept of theme cities offers a framework for attracting targeted investment in high-potential sectors.¹⁴ If successfully implemented, Amaravati has the potential to become a well-planned, modern capital city that drives economic growth, creates employment, and enhances the state’s administrative efficiency and identity.¹⁰ The “self-financing” potential through strategic land monetization remains a key opportunity, if land values appreciate as anticipated and management is prudent.³⁴

Ultimately, Amaravati’s future success now appears less dependent on policy debates and more contingent on the state government’s and APCRDA’s capacity for effective execution. Their ability to consistently secure funding, manage complex construction schedules, meet deadlines, fulfill commitments to stakeholders (especially LPS farmers), and foster a conducive environment for private investment will be the deciding factors in transforming the revived vision into a thriving reality.²³

VIII. Synthesis and Conclusion

A. Recapitulation: Amaravati’s Development Strategy, Key Projects, and Current Standing

The journey of Amaravati as Andhra Pradesh’s proposed capital has been marked by grand ambition, innovative approaches, deep political divisions, and significant disruption. Born out of the necessity created by state bifurcation in 2014, the project aimed to build a world-class greenfield city on the banks of the Krishna River. The state government, diverging from expert advice advocating decentralization, chose a central location in the fertile VGTM region. Land assembly was primarily achieved through a large-scale, voluntary Land Pooling Scheme (LPS), linking the fortunes of thousands of farmers to the project’s success. A comprehensive master plan featuring nine theme cities and sustainable design principles was developed with international input.

Initial infrastructure development commenced but was abruptly halted in 2019 following a change in government, which introduced a plan for three separate capitals. This policy reversal led to five years of stagnation, intense farmer protests, and complex legal battles. The Andhra Pradesh High Court ultimately invalidated the three-capital legislation and mandated the completion of Amaravati as the sole capital, upholding the state’s commitments under the APCRDA Act and LPS agreements. Following another change in government in 2024, the state formally accepted the High Court’s verdict, withdrew its Supreme Court challenge, and reinstated Amaravati as the single capital. Currently, development activities have resumed with renewed vigour, backed by significant tendering activity and ambitious timelines, alongside plans for further expansion, including a potential second phase of land pooling and an international airport.

B. Critical Analysis: Successes, Failures, and Lessons Learned

The Amaravati project offers several critical lessons in urban development and public policy.

• Successes: The initial phase of the Land Pooling Scheme demonstrated a potential model for large-scale land assembly with landowner participation, achieving significant buy-in initially.³ The development of a comprehensive, detailed master plan with international expertise provided a strong foundation for planned urban growth.¹⁴
• Failures: The decision to disregard the Sivaramakrishnan Committee’s recommendations regarding location and decentralization created a foundational vulnerability that contributed to later political instability.⁸ The most significant failure was the inability of successive governments (due to political reversal and subsequent delays) to deliver on the core promises of the LPS – namely, the timely provision of developed plots with infrastructure – causing immense hardship to participating farmers and undermining trust.¹ The political disruption led directly to massive project delays and significant cost escalations, highlighting the financial consequences of policy volatility.³⁴
• Lessons Learned: The Amaravati experience underscores the critical importance of broad political consensus and continuity for the success of long-term, large-scale mega-projects. It highlights the risks inherent in highly centralized greenfield developments, particularly when they diverge from expert advice on regional balance and environmental considerations. The case demonstrates the crucial need for governments to meticulously honour commitments made under schemes like LPS, as failure to do so can lead to profound social unrest and legal challenges. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need for realistic financial planning and risk assessment, acknowledging the potential for cost overruns and the fiscal burden associated with large-scale borrowing and state guarantees.

C. Concluding Assessment: Amaravati’s Prospects as Andhra Pradesh’s Capital

The path for Amaravati’s development as the sole capital of Andhra Pradesh is now legally and politically clear. The current state government exhibits strong determination to revive the project and realize the original vision. Construction has resumed, and significant financial resources are being allocated through new tenders.

However, formidable challenges persist. Securing the vast, ongoing funding required, managing the substantial existing debt, and executing the complex construction program within the highly ambitious timelines set by the government will demand exceptional efficiency and sustained focus. The plan for further large-scale land acquisition needs careful handling to maintain social harmony. Perhaps most critically, the government must navigate the delicate balance between concentrating resources on the capital city and ensuring equitable development across all regions of Andhra Pradesh to address lingering concerns about regional disparities.

Ultimately, Amaravati’s success will be measured not just by the completion of buildings and infrastructure, but by its ability to attract the envisioned economic activity, generate employment, and evolve into a vibrant, functional, and inclusive urban center. Its prospects hinge on the government’s capacity for sustained commitment, effective implementation over the coming years, and its success in transforming Amaravati from a contested project into a widely accepted symbol of Andhra Pradesh’s progress and identity.

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